The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric Utilities in the United States
研究发现，美国电力行业早期为降低融资成本，行业领袖主动接受州级回报率监管以换取区域垄断，监管确实降低了借贷成本但幅度较小，且受监管州的电力产出更高。
We provide evidence that the problem of raising capital in the early days of the U.S. electric-utility industry motivated industry leaders to embrace state rate-of-return regulation in return for a secure territorial monopoly. Utility executives anticipated that this would lead to a reduction in borrowing costs. Using firm-level bond data for 1910–1919, we estimate a model and find that state regulation led to lower borrowing costs but that the magnitude of the reduction was small. We also find evidence that output of electric utilities in states with regulation was higher than output in states without regulation.