Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
研究了在任意数量选民模型中，信念正相关对投票规则设计的影响，提出了一种基于排序一致性的正相关概念（TS相关），并刻画了满足序贯贝叶斯激励相容且对局部扰动稳健的投票规则集。
We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called TS correlation. We characterize the set of Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg (1988)) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfying robustness with respect to local perturbations. We provide an example of a voting rule that satisfies OBIC with respect to all TS-correlated beliefs. The generally positive results contrast sharply with the negative results obtained for the independent case by Majumdar and Sen (2004) and parallel similar results in the auction design model (Cremer anf McLean (1988)).