The Provision of (Two‐way) Converters in the Transition Process to a New Incompatible Technology
研究了向不兼容新技术过渡时转换器的动态提供，发现市场可能由错误群体提供转换器或提供时机过晚，因为提供者忽略了给对手技术用户带来的正外部性。
This paper analyzes the dynamic provision of converters in the transition process between two incompatible technologies. I derive the equilibrium behavior in the provision of converters and compare it to the socially optimal outcome. I find that there can be two types of market inefficiency in the provision of converters. First, converters can be supplied by the “wrong” group. Second, the timing of provision may be too late since the providers of converters ignore the positive externality that their provision would confer on the users of the rival technology.