Matching to share risk
研究两个群体（如男性和女性）通过匹配来分担外生收入风险的模型，发现稳定匹配总是存在且唯一，并呈现负向匹配：风险厌恶程度高的男性与风险厌恶程度低的女性配对。
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\\textquotedblleft males\\textquotedblright\\ and \\textquotedblleft females\\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.