International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting*
研究了公民选举政府时国际环境协定的结果，发现全球污染下当选政治家忽视环境，协定无效；若政府非合作决策，当选者可能更环保，生态损害更小。
Abstract This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of “global” pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non‐cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.