Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
研究卖方出价、双方信息不确定的讨价还价模型中，不确定性如何影响达成协议的时间延迟。通过构建弱平稳分离均衡，发现当交易收益为共同知识时，均衡中报价间隔趋于零，卖方初始报价几乎必然收敛到买方最低估值。
This paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one-sided offer bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers. We construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period. We completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions, and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero, the seller's initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge.