The Value of Information in the Court: Get it Right, Keep it Tight
通过估计美国最高法院大法官决策的均衡模型，发现44%的案件中大法官因案件信息改变了初始倾向，证实了信息在司法决策中的重要价值，并揭示了最高法院近25年来的政治化趋势。
We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design.