Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
提出一种代理竞争双向拍卖机制，使买卖双方在考虑运费和销售税差异时仍能按真实估价出价，实现预算平衡和渐进效率，适用于C2C市场及多替代品场景。
This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one’s true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities.