BORDERS AS BOUNDARIES TO FISCAL POLICY INTERACTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLITICIANS’ OPINIONS ON RIVALS IN THE COMPETITION FOR FIRMS
研究德国地方政治家对吸引企业竞争的看法，发现靠近边界的地区更可能将其他州或国家的辖区视为主要竞争对手，这对空间依赖模型估计有重要影响。
ABSTRACT Studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concentrate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analyzed region, and disregard possible extraregional effects. However, the theoretical spatial statistics literature shows that biased estimates might emerge if spatial interactions extend beyond the boundaries of the available data (i.e., the boundary value problem). This paper empirically assesses the practical relevance of this concern by studying German local politicians’ assessments of their jurisdictions’ main competitors in the struggle to attract firms. We find that location near a border significantly undermines politicians’ perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20 km (10.2 km) from a national (international) border. These results indicate that nearest municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country where they are located, which has important implications for estimating spatial dependence models.