Monopsony Wage Determination and Multiple Unemployment Equilibria in a Non- Linear Search Model
研究企业雇佣多人并受益于团队生产时，买方垄断工资决定可能呈现反常的比较静态性质，并导致多重均衡，其中一种均衡具有自增强特性，为解释低效均衡提供了新视角。
This paper extends the analysis of wage determination in a search environment to the case where firms employ numerous individuals and benefit from team production. It is shown that monopsony wage offers may display perverse comparative statics properties. Interesting problems then arise concerning the uniqueness of search equilibria. These problems are addressed in a simple equilibrium setting where it is shown that multiple equilibria may exist, with an equilibrium that displays bootstrap properties. Our results suggest the possibility of explaining unsatisfactory equilibria as the consequence of profit-maximizing wage choices in environments with imperfectly coordinated trading.