Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure
研究资本结构与投资风险的联合决定，发现最优资本结构需权衡债务税盾、违约成本及资产替代引发的代理成本，并探讨风险管理如何影响杠杆决策。
ABSTRACT The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs ( Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) ), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution ( Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.