论多数规则的稳健性

On The Robustness of Majority Rule

Journal of the European Economic Association · 2008
被引 206
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

证明简单多数规则在比任何其他投票规则更大的偏好域上满足帕累托性质、匿名性、中立性和(一般)传递性;若将中立性替换为无关选项独立性,则一致同意规则有类似结论。

Abstract

We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic) transitivity on a bigger class of preference domains than any other voting rule. If we replace neutrality in the above list of properties with independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the corresponding\nconclusion holds for unanimity rule (rule by consensus).

多数决帕累托性质匿名性中立性传递性