On the Stewardship Value of Soft Managerial Reports
研究了管理层私下掌握的、无法验证的信息在监管中是否有价值，发现需要硬信息能部分验证软报告的真实性，且软硬信息都不能太有助于激励努力，否则报告没有价值。
ABSTRACT We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for communication of private, unverifiable managerial information to be valuable for stewardship purposes. First, the hard, verifiable information must be able to confirm to some extent the truthfulness of the manager's soft, unverifiable report. Second, neither the hard, verifiable information nor the soft, unverifiable managerial report should be too informative for providing effort incentives because that makes it harder to motivate truthful reports from the manager. In particular, this conflict can be sufficiently severe that eliciting reports from the manager has no value.