Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring
构建了一个动态合同模型，解释外部投资者可能提前终止项目导致企业短视行为，并证明投资者监督能克服短期投资偏差、延长企业规划期。
The paper presents a dynamic contracting model of myopic firm behaviour caused by the fear of early project termination by outside investors. Although the parties can conclude longterm contracts, asymmetric information between investors and firms can make it impossible to implement profitable long-term projects. The paper characterizes the structure of optimal, renegotiation-proof contracts for unmonitored and monitored finance. Monitoring by investors, although itself subject to distorting incentive constraints, is shown to be able to overcome the short-term bias of investment and thus to lengthen the firms' planning horizon.