Uncertainty and the Politics of Employment Protection
通过一般均衡模型研究就业保护法规的社会偏好，发现解雇成本低时低生产率工人支持转向刚性劳动力市场，而高生产率工人仅在中间水平时支持维持刚性，且经济波动和低生产率增长仅在租金高的经济中增加对刚性的政治支持。
This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold; when their status quo level is high, preserving a rigid labor market is favored only by the employed with intermediate productivity. A more volatile environment and a lower rate of productivity growth increase the political support for labor market rigidity only in high-rents economies.