PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS
建立了一个成本信息共享的动态模型，发现对于纯公共物品，信息更充分的个体有正向激励与邻居分享信息，且社交圈越小激励越强、公共物品提供越多。
I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.