Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange
研究产权不安全及其伴随的执行成本如何影响交换效率，发现预期交换可能引发高昂执行成本，使得不交换的有限和解反而更优，从而揭示限制交换与安全产权发展之间的关系。
We examine the effect of insecure property and its accompanying enforcement costs on the ef®ciency of exchange. Because of the large enforcement costs that may be induced by the expectation of exchange, limited settlement without exchange may be ex ante superior for an adversary or even Pareto dominant. We therefore show how the removal of restrictions on exchange and the development of secure property are related. For much of history and in many places in the world today, property over economic resources has been or still is insecure. To enforce their claims on such resources, interested parties typically have to engage in litigation, monitoring or even arming and pay the enforcement costs that accompany such actions. The size of these costs can be expected to depend, among other factors, on the stakes involved. But for the same insecure and contested resource the stakes can be different depending on whether the resource is transferable or exchangeable once captured. What does the presence of enforcement costs imply for the ex ante ef®ciency of different forms of settlement? Is ex post ef®cient exchange always ex ante Pareto optimal?