The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation
研究在相互依赖价值环境中，共同先验假设对稳健实施的影响，分析公共品供给模型中正负信息外部性下的策略互补与替代关系，并比较有无共同先验时的实施条件。
We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Speci cally, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents ' reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities. We derive the necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation in common prior type spaces and contrast this with our earlier results without the common prior. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation do not depend on the existence of a common prior. In contrast, with strategic substitutes, the implementation conditions are much weaker under the common prior assumption.