Testing the Political Replacement Effect: A Panel Data Analysis*
检验了Acemoglu和Robinson提出的政治替代效应，即执政者是否推行市场化改革取决于其是否担心失去权力，利用102个国家1980-2005年的面板数据证实了政治竞争与经济改革之间的非单调关系。
Abstract This article tests for the existence of the political replacement effect, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson: [ American Political Science Review , Vol. 100, pp. 115–131]. They argue that the implementation of market‐oriented reform is crucially driven by the political calculus of incumbent governments: they implement economic policy change if such a choice is not expected to reduce their chances to retain power. This implies a non‐monotonic relationship between the level of political competition and the extent of economic reform. We test this hypothesis using data for 102 countries over the period 1980 to 2005. Our results strongly support the theory.