Agency Problems in Large Family Business Groups
研究了家族企业集团中，管理者为控制家族而非全体股东服务所产生的特殊代理问题，例如为保护旧投资而压制创新，并比较其与股权分散公司代理问题的严重性。
Greater managerial ownership in family firms need not mitigate agency problems, especially when each family controls a group of publicly traded and private firms, as is the case in most countries. Such structures give rise to their own set of agency problems, as managers act for the controlling family, but not for shareholders in general. For example, to avoid what we call “creative self–destruction,” a family might quash innovation in one firm to protect its obsolete investment in another. At present, we do not know whether these agency problems are more or less serious impediments to general prosperity than those afflicting widely held firms.