Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game
研究两党在通胀和失业目标不同时，与理性工资制定者的重复博弈，发现政治周期导致的经济波动与传统政治商业周期不同，且声誉机制或共同政策规则可减少波动。
This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.