IPO Pricing in the Dot‐com Bubble
研究1999-2000年互联网泡沫期间IPO首日收益率异常高的原因，发现IPO前所有权结构和内部人出售行为的变化降低了关键决策者控制抑价的激励，从而部分解释了定价行为的转变。
ABSTRACT IPO underpricing reached astronomical levels during 1999 and 2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by marked changes in pre‐IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over the period, which reduced key decision makers' incentives to control underpricing. After controlling for these changes, the difference in underpricing between 1999 and 2000 and the preceding three years is much reduced. Our results suggest that it was firm characteristics that were unique during the “dot‐com bubble” and that pricing behavior followed from incentives created by these characteristics.