Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
研究了在分配不可分割物品时，维克里分配规则是唯一同时满足策略证明性、福利匿名性和个体理性这三个条件的分配规则，对机制设计者和政策制定者有参考价值。
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness , anonymity in welfare , and individual rationality .