Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan
研究发现，受租约法规保护的固定租金佃农长期效率低于自耕农和不受保护的佃农，尤其当农业收入非其主要家庭收入来源时，表明租佃改革并非提升农业效率的万能药。
Fixed-rent tenancy was traditionally regarded as equally efficient as owner-cultivators. The counter-example is, however, presented here. Specifically, tenants with fixed-rent contracts and well protected by tenancy regulations may, in the long run, tum out to be less efficient than other farmers (e.g., owner-cultivators and informal tenants), particularly when they do not heavily depend on farm revenue as major source of family income. On the other hand, tenants who are not benefited from tenancy regulations might not be less efficient than owner-cultivators. The underlying implication is tenancy reform is not a panacea for improving farming efficiency; it may result in many negative effects in the long run.