Defense and Welfare Under Rivalry
两个小国面临战争风险，从世界其他地区进口武器和消费品，国防品是公共品。研究发现最优国防供给的反应曲线可能向后弯曲，但纳什均衡中至少一条曲线斜率为正，并推导了比较静态结果。
Two small countries facing a constant probability of war with each other import arms for consumption goods from the rest of the world. The defense good, produced by combining arms and army, is a public good. The reaction curve depicting the optimal supply of the defense good turns out to be backward‐bending. Nevertheless, at least one of the reaction curves is positively sloped at the unique Nash equilibrium. Several comparative statics results are derived. For example, if one country's reaction curve is negatively sloped, military aid to the rival leads to a decline in its optimal supply of the defense good.