Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance
证明，当一种特定的适应性学习过程收敛时，玩家学会的策略组合等价于那些经过迭代弱占优剔除后存活的策略，从而支持理性玩家不应使用迭代弱占优策略的观点。
This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is small in that its bounds are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The results hold regardless of the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.