The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining: A Study of the Cable Television Industry
研究买方合并如何影响供应商与多个买家之间的双边谈判，发现合并对买家谈判地位的影响取决于供应商总剩余函数的曲率，有线电视行业数据表明该函数为凸函数，暗示有线运营商横向整合是为了效率而非增强谈判地位。
We examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers. Merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects. The effect of merger on the buyers' bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier's gross surplus function: merger enhances (worsens) the buyers' bargaining position if the function is concave (convex). Based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry, our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex. This result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis program suppliers. © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology