Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation
研究了国际关联下银行救助的模型，发现缺乏合作时银行间联系越强各国政府利益越分化，而跨境资产持有则使利益趋同，并分析了不同合作形式对全球和国家福利的影响。
Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally. As a result, financial crises and government intervention have stronger effects beyond borders. We provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bailouts. While a social planner trades off tax distortions, liquidation losses, and intra- and intercountry income inequality, in the noncooperative game between governments there are inefficiencies due to externalities, a lack of burden sharing, and free riding. We show that, in absence of cooperation, stronger interbank linkages make government interests diverge, whereas cross-border asset holdings tend to align them. We analyze different forms of cooperation and their effects on global and national welfare.