To Monitor or Not to Monitor
研究在传统绩效薪酬和增益分享两种薪酬制度下，管理者如何通过绩效评价回应员工的同伴监督行为，发现观察性监督对绩效评价有正面影响，而建议性监督的影响则因薪酬制度而异。
An untested assumption in the gainsharing and group incentive literatures is that peer monitoring is an activity that employees will engage in, and this behavior will be supported by their managers. This study tests that assumption by examining how managers respond (via performance ratings of workers) to peer monitoring under two different pay conditions—traditional merit pay and merit pay with gainsharing. Data from 203 employees in a custom brokerage and freight-forwarding services firm suggest that observational monitoring (i.e., noticing coworkers' behavior) is positively associated with manager ratings of workers' performance under both pay conditions. However, advisory monitoring (i.e., reacting to coworkers' behavior) is positively related to manager ratings of workers' performance under gainsharing and negatively related to manager ratings of workers' performance under traditional merit pay. Implications of these findings for managers are discussed.