Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence *
研究了公共采购中如何通过评分拍卖设计激励承包商加快交付，以加州高速公路项目数据证明该设计使工期缩短30-40%，通勤者福利收益超过采购成本增加，并估计全面采用最优设计可带来近22%合同价值的福利增益。
In public procurement, social welfare often depends on how quickly the good is delivered. A leading example is highway construction, where slow completion inflicts a negative externality on commuters. In response, highway departments award some contracts using scoring auctions, which give contractors explicit incentives for accelerated delivery. We characterize efficient design of these mechanisms. We then gather an extensive data set of highway projects awarded by the California Department of Transportation between 2003 and 2008. By comparing otherwise similar contracts, we show that where the scoring design was used, contracts were completed 30--40% faster and the welfare gains to commuters exceeded the increase in procurement costs. Using a structural model that endogenizes participation and bidding, we estimate that the counterfactual welfare gain from switching all contracts from the standard design to the efficient A+B design is nearly 22% of the total contract value ($1.14 billion). Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.