应收账款管理政策:理论与证据

Accounts Receivable Management Policy: Theory and Evidence

Journal of Finance · 1992
被引 609
人大 A+FT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

提出并检验了企业选择应收账款管理政策的决定因素,发现企业规模、客户集中度及债务信用评级对保理、应收账款担保债务、专属财务子公司等政策有重要影响,且专属子公司有助于灵活财务契约,但未发现其损害债权人利益。

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests hypotheses that explain the choice of accounts receivable management policies. The tests focus on both cross‐sectional explanations of policy‐choice determinants, as well as incentives to establish captives. We find size, concentration, and credit standing of the firm's traded debt and commercial paper are each important in explaining the use of factoring, accounts receivable secured debt, captive finance subsidiaries, and general corporate credit. We also offer evidence that captive formation allows more flexible financial contracting. However, we find no evidence that captive formation expropriates bondholder wealth.

应收账款管理政策保理应收账款担保债务财务子公司