On the Faustian Dynamics of Policy and Political Power
研究当前政策如何影响未来政治权力分配，揭示统治者面临的两难：坚持当前政策会削弱未来权力，而维护权力则需牺牲当前政策目标。
This paper examines the <it>Faustian dynamics</it> of policy and power. We posit a general class of dynamic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power, resulting in the following “Faustian trade-off”: if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy, he then sacrifices future political power; yet if he wants to preserve his future power, he must sacrifice his present policy objectives. The trade-off comes from the fact that the current political ruler/pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power. A <it>policy-endogenous (PE) equilibrium</it> describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time. We show that the Faustian trade-off in a PE equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales. The <it>political preservation effect</it> induces more tempered policy choices than if one's policy choice did not affect one's political fortunes. However, the <it>reformation effect</it> induces “more aggressive” policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors. We distinguish between political systems that give rise to <it>monotone Faustian dynamics</it>—political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders—and <it>cyclical Faustian dynamics</it>—political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders. In each case, we show that the Faustian trade-off moderates the choices of each type of leader.