Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist
模型分析耐用品垄断者如何通过周期性降价来区分不同支付意愿的消费者，对研究定价策略和价格歧视的经济学者有参考价值。
In the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination. A new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period, interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay. Within each cohort, consumers vary in their tastes for the good. Under broad conditions, the seller will vary the price over time. In most periods, he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay. Periodically, however, he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay.