Task assignments and incentives: generalists versus specialists
构建了一个代理模型，研究任务广度不同的工作分配问题，发现技能均衡的工人更可能被分配到多任务岗位，并探讨了信息不对称下工人分类的激励问题，结合多种证据说明相对能力和多任务在非学术研究科学家管理分配中的重要性。
I develop an agency model of job assignments where jobs differ based on the breadth of tasks. A tradeoff between task complementarities and relative abilities of workers results in those with balanced skills being assigned to multitask jobs. The same tradeoff between complementarities and relative abilities also influences incentives to sort privately informed workers to jobs. I then draw on a variety of sources (survey data, case studies, and anecdotal evidence) to suggest that relative abilities and multitasking play an important role in managerial assignments of nonacademic research scientists.