Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling
分析美国审计失败的原因，微观层面提出道德诱惑理论解释专业人士如何被利益冲突潜移默化地腐蚀，宏观层面用议题周期理论说明为何大型会计事务所普遍存在利益冲突。
A series of financial scandals revealed a key weakness in the American business model: the failure of the U.S. auditing system to deliver true independence. We offer a two-tiered analysis of what went wrong. At the more micro tier, we advance moral seduction theory, explaining why professionals are often unaware of how morally compromised they have become by conflicts of interest. At the more macro tier, we offer issue-cycle theory, explaining why conflicts of interest of the sort that compromise major accounting firms are so pervasive.