Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union
研究了中心化监管机构依赖地方监管者收集信息的“中心-分支”监管体系对监管者和银行行为的影响，发现中央与地方监管者政策分歧较小时，中央化能增加检查努力并降低银行风险，分歧较大时则相反。
We study the consequences for supervisors’ and banks’ behavior of a “hub-and-spokes” supervisory system where a centralized agency has authority over banks but relies on local supervisors to collect actionable information. The model entails a principal-agent problem between central and local supervisors that leads to tougher supervisory standards but less compliance on the side of the supervised banks. Centralization entails greater inspection effort by the local supervisor and less bank risk taking if the divergence in the intervention policy of the central and the local supervisors is sufficiently small, but less effort and riskier bank portfolios if the divergence is large. The model has implications for the design of supervisory frameworks within integrated economies. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.