Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets
研究两个竞争零售商向共同制造商提出要么接受要么放弃的合同，发现预付款是均衡合同的特征，且最终只有一个零售商从制造商处购买，这解释了小制造商因预付款而难以广泛分销产品的现象。
Although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers to a common manufacturer. We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer. These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.