The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining*
研究多原告诉讼中集体谈判的策略性运用，分析其如何通过改变赔偿分配、信息不对称和代表委托来影响被告的谈判激励，对法律经济学和谈判研究者有参考价值。
This article studies the strategic use of collective negotiation in multiplaintiff litigation. Compared with one-on-one negotiation, collective negotiation can change the distribution of per-plaintiff damages in a manner that influences the defendant's bargaining incentive. Informational asymmetry among the members of collective action and delegation of bargaining to a self-interested representative can yield a tougher bargaining position. A plaintiff's decision to join the collective action can signal his type, which in turn influences the defendant's bargaining behavior. In equilibrium, some plaintiffs join the action for fear of sending a bad signal. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association