Nonparametric Identification of a Contract Model With Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
研究了包含逆向选择和道德风险的合同模型的非参数识别问题，扩展了Laffont和Tirole的虚假道德风险模型，识别了需求、成本、转移支付和努力负效用函数以及随机元素的联合分布，并利用工具变量识别了公共资金成本。
This paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard. Specifically, we consider the false moral hazard model developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986). We first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions. We establish the nonparametric identification of the demand, cost, deterministic transfer, and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model, which are the firm's type and the demand, cost, and transfer shocks. The cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument. Testable restrictions of the model are characterized.