ASSET‐BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE*
研究在借贷约束限制自我保险的背景下，政府如何根据个人资产状况设计最优失业保险计划，发现美国现行计划对资产贫困者接近最优，但对较富裕者过于慷慨。
This article studies a model of consumption, savings, and job search in which a borrowing constraint limits self‐insurance. The government administers the unemployment insurance program that may condition on an individual’s asset position, but not on her efforts of finding a job. To compensate for the impediments to self‐insurance, benefit payments should optimally be set higher at lower wealth levels and peak for borrowing‐constrained individuals with zero liquid funds. A quantitative exercise reveals that the U.S. unemployment insurance program is surprisingly close to optimal for the asset poor, but far too generous for wealthier individuals.