央行沟通与流动性陷阱

Central Bank Communication and the Liquidity Trap

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2010
被引 26
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

研究央行沟通如何影响市场预期,发现不沟通政策规则会导致学习均衡,引发长期通缩和增长缓慢,而沟通有助于稳定预期并实现通胀目标。

Abstract

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants' expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy where agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents' learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank's transparency about its policy rule. A monetary authority that does not communicate its rule can induce “learning equilibria” where the economy experiences prolonged periods of deflation and slow growth. More generally, small expectational errors can result in complex economic dynamics, inducing welfare‐reducing fluctuations. On the contrary, central bank communication helps stabilizing expectations around the inflation target equilibrium.

中央银行沟通流动性陷阱预期管理非线性货币政策模型