Health Insurance, Health Savings Accounts and Healthcare Utilization
在对称信息假设下，研究了高免赔额健康计划搭配税收优惠健康储蓄账户对储蓄和医疗利用的影响，发现该组合在合理风险偏好下比全额保险更促进储蓄、减少治疗，且税收补贴和免赔额大小的影响取决于多种因素。
Assuming symmetric information, we show that a high-deductible health plan (HDHP) combined with a tax-favored health savings account (HSA) induces more savings and less treatment compared with a full coverage plan under reasonable risk preferences. Furthermore, a higher tax subsidy increases savings in any case but decreases medical utilization if and only if treatment expenses are above the deductible. A larger deductible increases savings but does not necessarily decrease healthcare utilization. Whether an HDHP/HSA combination is preferred over a full coverage contract depends on absolute risk aversion. A higher tax advantage increases the attractiveness of an HDHP/HSA combination, whereas the effects of changes in the deductible are ambiguous. The paper shows that a potential regulator needs to carefully set the size of the deductible as only in a certain corridor of the probability of sickness, its effect on aggregate healthcare costs are unambiguously favorable.