Foreign Money Shocks and the Welfare Performance of Alternative Monetary Policy Regimes*
在一个两国粘性价格模型中，研究了受外国货币冲击的国家在不同货币政策体制下的福利表现，发现价格目标制优于货币目标制和固定汇率制，且福利最大化规则能降低产出和汇率波动。
Abstract The welfare properties of monetary policy regimes for a country subject to foreign money shocks are examined in a two‐country sticky‐price model. Money targeting is found to be welfare superior to a fixed exchange rate when the expenditure switching effect of exchange rate changes is relatively weak, but a fixed rate is superior when the expenditure switching effect is strong. However, price targeting is superior to both these regimes for all values of the expenditure switching effect. A welfare‐maximising monetary rule yields lower output and exchange rate volatility than price targeting for a wide range of parameter values.