Combating moral hazard in agri-environmental schemes: a multiple-agent approach
研究了监管者在农业环境合同中面临农民特征不确定性的道德风险问题，发现农民诚实比例增加反而可能导致作弊总数上升。
We introduce uncertainty about farmer characteristics into the moral hazard problem facing a regulator offering agri-environmental contracts. Our model allows for a continuum of farmer compliance costs. For reasonable parameter values the model predicts high levels of cheating and intensive monitoring, contrary to the evidence. We therefore add variation in farmers' propensity to cheat, the regulator's assessment of which has a decisive effect on policy: if farmers are overwhelmingly honest then the regulator reduces monitoring and accepts that some dishonest farmers will escape undetected. Paradoxically, the total number of cheats may increase following an increase in the number of honest farmers.