Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market
利用企业层面数据分析加州放松管制电力市场（1998-2000年）的定价行为，发现多数时期符合古诺竞争，2000年夏季和秋季竞争略有减弱，但价格飙升主要由成本和需求变化驱动，而非企业行为改变。
This paper analyzes the pricing behavior of electricity generating firms in the restructured California market from its inception in April 1998 until its collapse in late 2000. Using detailed firm-level data, I find that conduct is fairly consistent with a Cournot pricing game for much of the sample. In summer and fall 2000, the market was slightly less competitive, yet the dramatic rise in prices was more driven by changes in costs and demand than by changes in firm conduct. The five large nonutility generators raised prices slightly above unilateral market-power levels in 2000, but fell far short of colluding on the joint monopoly price. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.