Earnings Manipulation Risk, Corporate Governance Risk, and Auditors' Planning and Pricing Decisions
利用会计师事务所的客户风险评估数据，发现审计师对存在盈余操纵风险的客户会增加审计投入和收费，且当公司治理风险也较高时，这种正向关系更强。
This paper investigates auditors' assessments of earnings manipulation risk and corporate governance risk, and their planning and pricing decisions in the presence of these identified risks. To conduct this investigation, we use engagement partners' assessments of their existing clients made during the participating public accounting firm's client continuance risk assessment process. We find that auditors plan increased effort and billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation risk, and that the positive relationships between earnings manipulation risk and both effort and billing rates are greater for clients that also have heightened corporate governance risk. These findings provide evidence that auditors assess situations involving both an aggressive management and inadequate corporate governance, and that there is a relationship between those assessments and auditors' planning and pricing decisions.