Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes *
研究了当危机风险高时，是否需要通过关闭银行或强制出售资产来清理银行体系，发现受损银行持有非流动性资产的私人动机反而会加剧抛售和信贷紧缩，并讨论了替代清理方案的成本与收益。
Is there any need to clean up a banking system by closing some banks and forcing others to sell assets if the risk of a crisis becomes high? Impaired banks that may be forced to sell illiquid assets in the future have private incentives to hold, rather than sell, those assets Anticipating a potential fire sale, liquid buyers expect high returns, reducing their incentive to lend. Privately optimal trading decisions therefore lead to a worse fire sale and a larger drop in lending than is necessary. We discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.