A Strategic Deviance Perspective on the Franchise Form of Organizing
提出特许人无法在没有自营和加盟比较信息的情况下评估和控制机会主义，战略偏差概念解释了特许人为何接受多主体合同中的垂直和水平代理问题导致的偏差行为，混合形式通过社会控制和社会比较机制提升系统绩效。
Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, we propose that franchisors cannot assess and control opportunism absent comparative information provided by owning and operating some of their outlets and by franchising others. Moving beyond dyadic perspectives, we propose that the concept of strategic deviance suggests why franchisors accept deviant behavior resulting from vertical and horizontal agency problems in multiagent contracts. A plural form provides efficiency and quality benchmark information that curbs even greater levels of shirking and free–riding behaviors and enhances system performance. Opportunistic behaviors by company managers and franchisees are addressed through self–enforced social control and social comparison mechanisms.