Two‐Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers
分析了一个双边搜索模型中的匹配服务提供。代理人属于两个异质群体，分布在[0,1]区间，其效用等于配偶的指数。搜索均衡中，代理人形成子区间并只与同类匹配。婚介按集中程序匹配，若收取统一参与费，只有高质量代理人参与；若按匹配盈余收佣金，只有低质量代理人找中介。
This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two‐sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary.