Disclosure standards for vertical contracts
研究了纵向合同披露的福利影响，发现当零售竞争主要发生在同一供应商的产品之间时，披露会帮助供应商协调零售行为，损害消费者利益；而当竞争发生在不同供应商的品牌之间时，披露会加剧竞争，对消费者有利。
In this article, we investigate the welfare consequences of disclosure of vertical contracts. When much of retail competition is among products provided by a dominant supplier, disclosure provides a means through which the supplier can use its prices to coordinate the retail behavior of its wholesale customers. From the retail consumers' perspective, such coordination is unwanted, leading them to favor opacity of contracts. When retail competition is across brands made by different suppliers, disclosure becomes a conduit through which suppliers compete indirectly via their retail surrogates. Consumers welcome the increased competition accompanying such disclosures. In short, the efficacy of disclosure standards depends critically on the suppliers’ market reach and the relative intensity of intrabrand versus interbrand retail competition.